Showing posts with label failure. Show all posts
Showing posts with label failure. Show all posts

Friday, August 14, 2026

All the failures we cannot see

What is a failure?

We often define failure of an arthroplasty as a revision. It is evident, however, that the lack of a revision does not indicate that the patient has had a successful outcome. The lack of a revision simply indicates that the surgeon was unwilling to do another operation on the patient — or that the patient did not want more surgery, even though they were unhappy about the result.

If we equate revision and failure, many clinical failures go unseen. In the UK National Joint Registry, among 21,918 patients with a recorded postoperative Oxford Shoulder Score, 26.99% of those having a reverse total shoulder arthroplasty (RSA) had an unsatisfactory result, defined as an Oxford Shoulder Score below 29. Fewer than 1 in 20 of them (4.87%) were revised. Among patients with an unsatisfactory score, the proportion revised was 10.58% after anatomic total shoulder arthroplasty (aTSA) and 13.86% after hemiarthroplasty [1]. The authors concluded that the lower revision rate after RSA may not indicate better outcomes than anatomic arthroplasty, but rather a higher threshold for revising an RSA [1]. When an RSA fails, the prospect for improving the patient’s comfort and function is often poor, so the patient keeps the implant and keeps the disability.

Furthermore, achieving the minimal clinically important difference (MCID), the substantial clinical benefit, or the patient acceptable symptom state on the ASES, SANE, SST, or VAS after shoulder arthroplasty — the common indicators of a “successful arthroplasty” — did not correlate with patient satisfaction, with willingness to undergo the operation again, or with willingness to recommend it to a friend or family member [3]. In a prospective cohort of 1,559 RSAs, the 134 patients (8.6%) who rated themselves unchanged or worse had nevertheless improved on every measured outcome [4]. Their scores went up. They were not satisfied.

On one hand, a change in a patient-reported outcome that does not reach the MCID establishes that the patient has not improved. On the other hand, a change that exceeds the MCID does not establish that the patient is satisfied. MCID thresholds give strong evidence of failure and weak evidence of success.

Thus, the usual methods do not identify the patients who find their outcomes unsatisfactory.

Inspired by the wonderful book, “All the Light We Cannot See,” we wondered about “All the Failures We Cannot See”.


We are realizing that failure needs to be defined more broadly: the patient is dissatisfied or in pain, has sustained a complication, has been revised, or is simply not better than before surgery. The 1 in 10 patients who report themselves unchanged or worse after an anatomic total shoulder arthroplasty [5], and the roughly 1 in 5 who are dissatisfied after total knee arthroplasty [6], are where we can look for opportunities to improve our method by asking, as Codman would have us do, what could we have done differently that might have prevented the failure? [2, 8, 9]. Over five years Codman tracked his patients by sending them End Result Cards at a year after surgery, asking whether they were better. For those who were not better, he tried to determine why not [10]. What deserves emphasis is his method: he asked each patient for follow-up, and he did it with a simple card. The modern version of Codman’s card is a text message or an email, sent on the anniversary of the operation. The medium has changed; the method has not. Asking is what makes the failures visible.

When we identify a patient with an unsatisfactory result, we have a unique opportunity to ask questions such as “If I had chosen a different implant, if my implant fixation had been better, might this failure have been avoided? Should I have operated on this patient at all? What is different about my care of this patient in contrast to comparable patients in my practice who did well?” As Pearl has argued, these counterfactual questions are the language of causal reasoning [11].

It is important to avoid naming the mode of failure and calling it the cause. “Glenoid component loosening” is not a cause; it is what happened. The question is what led to it — the bone quality, the deformity, the technique of bone preparation, or the seating of the component.

By analogy, consider a report that the battle was lost because the general did not arrive. The general’s absence was not the cause; it was what happened. The battle was lost because the farrier failed to place the horseshoe nails properly, the shoe came loose, the horse stumbled, the general broke his leg, and he could not lead the charge. Once recognized, the nail placement is the thing that must be fixed before the next battle. So the question for us is: what might we do to reduce the risk of glenoid component failure in the next case?

How can we see our failures?

It starts with a secure log of our own cases.

(1)  For each surgery, enter the following

Name | Medical Record No. | Date of Birth | Mobile | Email

Diagnosis | Procedure | Surgery Date

(2)  Prepare a short message — a text or an email, sent through the institution’s patient portal or another secure channel — to go to the patient at 1 year after surgery.

I am interested in knowing how you are doing after your surgery. Please reply to this message. Are you better than before? Have you had any problems? If so, please let me know about them.

(3)  Trigger the message from the surgery date. A calendar reminder and a delayed send will do it; an automated text service will do it without your having to remember. This trigger is the whole reason the log exists.

(4)  When the patient replies, add the response to the log. When the patient does not reply, consider asking the office to telephone them.

Follow-up Date | Improved? | Additional Surgery?

(5)  For each failure (not improved, additional surgery), compare the case and its treatment with similar cases that did not fail.

(6)  Ask yourself what might have been done differently — patient selection, characterization of anatomy, procedure and implant choice, technique, perioperative management, team and system factors — to avoid the failure. Ask, as Codman did, “why not?” Enter this information into the log.

(7)  Keep the log where you will read it. Before a comparable case, look back at what you wrote about the last failure of that kind.

(8)  Recognize that each patient who finds their outcome unsatisfactory is an opportunity to refine your method. Two failures of the same kind are not two instances of one thing. A dislocation after reverse total shoulder arthroplasty in one patient and a dislocation in another are different events — a different patient, a different anatomy, a different set of decisions, a different day in the operating room — and a unique opportunity to learn.

Final thoughts

The measure of success is the steady refinement of our method across a career. Each of us has the opportunity to see whether our patients are better, and to learn from those who are not. Each patient who reports that they are no better is one case we can learn from.

Some of us might prefer to avoid asking a question that carries the risk of getting a “bad news” response. Others might want to avoid calling the patient’s attention to a suboptimal outcome. However, the opposite may be true — by asking, we show the patient that we care. Furthermore, in seeing the failure we may identify a chance to remedy it.

The opportunity to identify, learn from and care for these patients is there for each of us.


Seeing by looking

Short eared owl

Skagit


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References

[1] O’Malley O, Davies A, Rangan A, Sabharwal S, Reilly P. Is there a difference in thresholds for revision between shoulder arthroplasty types? A National Joint Registry study. PLoS One. 2025;20(8):e0330975. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0330975

[2] Menendez ME, Matsen FA 3rd. Learning from surgical failures. J Bone Joint Surg Am. 2026;108(8):547-548. doi:10.2106/JBJS.25.01110

[3] Khan AZ, Vaughan A, Aman ZS, Lazarus MD, Williams GR, Namdari S. Reaching MCID, SCB, and PASS for ASES, SANE, SST, and VAS following shoulder arthroplasty does not correlate with patient satisfaction. Semin Arthroplasty JSES. 2024;34(4):819-826. doi:10.1053/j.sart.2024.03.017

[4] Parsons M, Routman HD, Roche CP, Friedman RJ. Patient-reported outcomes of reverse total shoulder arthroplasty: a comparative risk factor analysis of improved versus unimproved cases. JSES Open Access. 2019;3(3):174-178. doi:10.1016/j.jses.2019.07.004. PMID:31709358

[5] Hao KA, Hones KM, O’Keefe DS, Elwell J, Simovitch RW, Wright TW, King JJ, Schoch BS. Does the relationship between preoperative function and achievement of clinically important benchmarks of success after total shoulder arthroplasty depend on outcome assessment design? Clin Orthop Relat Res. 2025;483(3):377-395. doi:10.1097/CORR.0000000000003347. PMID:39778205

[6] Bourne RB, Chesworth BM, Davis AM, Mahomed NN, Charron KDJ. Patient satisfaction after total knee arthroplasty: who is satisfied and who is not? Clin Orthop Relat Res. 2010;468(1):57-63. doi:10.1007/s11999-009-1119-9. PMID:19844772

[8] Codman EA. The product of a hospital. Surg Gynecol Obstet. 1914;18:491-496.

[9] Reverby S. Stealing the golden eggs: Ernest Amory Codman and the science and management of medicine. Bull Hist Med. 1981;55(2):156-171. PMID:7020802

[10] Codman EA. A Study in Hospital Efficiency: As Demonstrated by the Case Report of the First Five Years of a Private Hospital. Boston, MA: Thomas Todd Co.; 1918.

[11] Pearl J, Mackenzie D. The Book of Why: The New Science of Cause and Effect. New York, NY: Basic Books; 2018.

Thursday, April 30, 2026

Since the surgeon is the method, how can surgeons improve their method?


Intelligence that is not artificial

As craftsmen, each of us surgeons want to get better at our craft.

Because much of what we do turns out well for our patients, our greatest opportunity for improvement comes from studying the instances in which the outcomes are adverse for them.

One way to do this is to keep an eye on the world's best population-based resource, the Australian Orthopaedic Association's National Joint Replacement Registry.

These data may inform the implants we use

the use of implant modifications


or the type of adverse outcomes we may encounnter



A complementary approach is presented in a recent JBJS article: Learning From Surgical Failures. The essence of this approach is asking the couterfactual question: what might have been done differently to lower the risk of this complication?

For example, one could consider the cases of failed pyrocarbon implants shown below and ask: "what could have been done differently in each case?"



While this kind of analysis is invaluable, the degree to which it applies to each of our own practices is uncertain.

Personal continuous quality improvement (PCQI)
An approach to learning from our own failures is presented in How a surgeon can learn from their own adverse outcomes - an example of intrapractice analysis in reverse shoulder arthroplasty. As illustrated in that blog post, this approach to introspection is straightforward.

For each adverse outcome in each of our own practices: (1) identify the mode of failure (e.g. displaced acromial stress fracture), (2) identify the important parameters of our treatment (e.g. position of the reverse total shoulder components), (3) compare these parameters in the case to those in similar patients in our practice who did not have the complication (controls), and (4) note the difference between the case and controls and consider adjusting our surgical technique in the direction of the controls (e.g. making sure that the distance between the glenosphere center of rotation to the acromion is greater than the distance between the glenosphere center of rotation to the greater tuberosity).



Each of us can be in a state of perpetual beta, continuing to ask the question,

"How can I get better?"


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Saturday, October 4, 2025

Fatal failures from failing to learn from failure

 

Soon after Anne and I arrived in Seattle, we became hooked on alpine climbing.

Three of our favorite climbs were:

The Inspiration Glacier Route on El Dorado




The Kautz Glacier Route on Mt. Rainier


and 

The West Ridge of Mt. Stuart


It occured to me that alpine climbing was similar to surgery in many ways: it is rewarding, it is technical, and it turns out well most of the time.
 
Also, like climbers, surgeons often do not learn from past failures.

My friend, Colton Bramson, loaned me a book last night called Accidents in North American Climbing 2023. What stuck me as I paged through this book was that a substantial number of fatalities occurred during rappelling. For the non-climbers among you, rappelling is a standard method of descending from a climb in which the climber slides down a rope that is fixed to an anchor.


In contrast to climbing up (where the climber is supported by his/her hands and feet), in rappelling the climber is completely dependent on (1) the anchor fixed to the rock or snow, (2) the link between the anchor and the rope (usually a combination of a carabiner and webbing or cord sling), (3) the rope (passed through  the anchor system so that the ends are of equal length with large knots at the end of each one), (4) the climber's harness, and (5) the link between the harness and the rope (such as a jumar). The technique of getting it right is shown in this link.  

As can easily be seen (as is the case in surgery) there are many points of potential failure:  anchor, carabiner, sling, harness, jumar and the rope (e.g. sliding off the end of the rope). 

Causes of fatal rappel falls have been well documented:

2004 Devils Tower — Fatal rappel error - no knots at the end of the rope 
2006: Sinks Canyon — Fatal fall while rappelling - no knots at the end of the rope
2016: Indian Creek — Uneven rope ends, no knots at the end of the rope
2017: Shelf Road — Fatal rappel error - improper set up of rappel system
2020: 6 rappel-anchor failures, 3 of them fatal 
2022: Joshua Tree (broken sling) - fatality
          Tahquitz (broken sling) - fatality
          Mt. Evans (fell while pulling rope after rappel) - fatality 

In spite of these examples of fatal errors from which climbers could learn, there were 8 known rappelling fatalities in 2023.

Accidents in North American Climbing sought to determine the cause of each failure, even when complete information was not available, and to suggest what could have been done to prevent the failure

45 yo female, Auburn Quarry-only one end of the rope passed through her belay device=>make sure both ends of the rappel rope are passed through the device

51 yo female, Joshua Tree-failure of old anchor and weathered sling=>avoid using anchor systems placed by prior climbers unless they are solid and in mint condition, take time to place new anchor system

22 yo female, Mt. Evans-fall while retrieving rappel rope=>make sure footing is secure and/or that the retrieving climber is anchored so that the act of rope retrieval does not cause a fall

58 yo female, El Dorado Canyon-one end of rope pulled through anchor=>tie knots in the end of each rope strand

two 67 yo males, Glacier National Park-hastily placed anchor pulled from rock=>take time to assure that anchor is solid and redundant

44 yo male, Leavenworth-poor anchor placement leading to anchor failure=>take time to assure that anchor is solid and redundant

33 yo female, Tahquitz Rock-failure of old anchor and weathered sling=>avoid using anchor systems placed by prior climbers unless they are solid and in mint condition, take time to place new anchor system


It is apparent that the American Alpine Club provides a great example of causal modeling. In each case, they sought to determine the counterfactual - what could have been done differently to prevent the rappelling accident - even in cases where complete information was not available.  In addition to the analyses of individual fatalities, they publish their results in their annual publication, Accidents in North American Climbing, so that all climbers have access to the results.

This a perfect example of learning from a relative small number of failures in a space - like orthopaedic surgery - where the great majority of cases are successful (see this link)

For more learning from failure in the mountains, see When Everest Climbers Die Because of Poor Decisions.

Surgery, like climbing, is usually wonderful, 
but past failures contain lessons for preventing future failures 


Mt. Rainier
August 2025


Follow on twitter/X: 
https://x.com/RickMatsen
Follow on facebook: https://www.facebook.com/shoulder.arthritis
Follow on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/rick-matsen-88b1a8133/

Here are some videos that are of shoulder interest
Shoulder arthritis - what you need to know (see this link).
How to x-ray the shoulder (see this link).
The ream and run procedure (see this link)
The total shoulder arthroplasty (see this link)
The cuff tear arthropathy arthroplasty (see this link).
The reverse total shoulder arthroplasty (see this link).
The smooth and move procedure for irreparable rotator cuff tears (see this link)
Shoulder rehabilitation exercises (see this link).

Wednesday, October 1, 2025

Mission Impossible? Reducing Risk of Revision for Failed Surgery

The Problem

Much of what we do in orthopaedic surgery has a high apparent success rate (85–90%). While encouraging, studies of shoulder arthroplasty, rotator cuff repair, and other interventions show that the proportion of patients achieving clinically meaningful improvements in comfort and function has not changed significantly for more than a decade.

This stagnation has persisted despite multiple innovations in technique, technology, implants, and biologics—which have been introduced often without clear evidence that they address the true causes of clinical failure.

Many of our colleagues believe that it is impossible to ferret out the causes of a failure requiring surgical revision because we were not there at the time of the original procedure. 


On the other hand, my collegue Chris Ahmad, points out that 


So, because of the importance of improving the quality of our patient care by reducing the revision rate, we go forward using the approach described in the recent post Surgical failures: what causes them and how can we do better for our patients. 



Step 1: Individual Case Analysis

Progress will depend on systematically examining the one in ten cases that require revision. The guiding question is:“Given what is known about this patient and procedure, what might have been done differently to reduce the risk of revision?”

Because the revising surgeon often did not perform the index surgery, she or he must reconstruct the case—much as aviation investigators reconstruct a crash. This requires integrating expertise and available evidence to specify plausible alternatives, knowing that many of the possible contributing factors cannot be accurately assessed (even if we have the "black box" or the operative note and preoperative images). 

Key elements we should pursue include:

  • Patient and shoulder characteristics before the index surgery

  • Details of the index procedure

  • Surgical alternatives used in similar cases

  • Findings at revision

  • Recognized causal links between surgical choices and failure modes (e.g. inadequate fixation of the glenoid component).


Menu of Causes

To support structured causal reasoning, revising surgeons are presented with a menu of recognized causes of failure.

For anatomic shoulder arthroplasty, examples include:

  • Inappropriate implant sizing

  • Inadequate fixation

  • Poor component positioning

  • Insufficient balancing of the humeral head on the glenoid

  • Other to be specified by surgeon

The revising surgeon selects the most plausible cause(s) or adds others, then assigns a rating to each:

  • 3 = Very likely contributed

  • 2 = Possibly contributed

  • 1 = Unlikely

  • 0 = No opinion / insufficient information


Embracing Uncertainty

This method explicitly acknowledges uncertainty. Surgeons are not asked for certainty, but for their best judgment, made transparent:

“I cannot know with certainty what would have happened with an alternative procedure, but given the case information and the published evidence, the most plausible cause of revision of this surgery is inadequate glenoid component seating and fixation.”

By making explicit the judgments that surgeons already form implicitly, this framework brings rigor and transparency to causal reasoning.


Step 2: Progressively Building a Case Library

By indexing and pooling these structured case analyses across many revisions, we can identify patterns that no single surgeon’s memory or experience could reveal.

Aggregated data will show:

  • Causes consistently endorsed (e.g., “flawed fixation and seating = very likely”)

  • Causes inconsistently endorsed

  • Causes rarely implicated

This approach transforms anecdote into evidence.


Step 3: Sharing the Knowledge

As the indexed library grows, it will provide a searchable knowledge base—providing case-based evidence to inform surgeon decisions for future patients with the diagnosis in question.

The larger the library, the more refined the collective insights become. By presenting and publishing results, surgeons’ attention will increasingly focus on actions that demonstrably reduce the risk of revision.

We need to accept the mission.

Just because it's difficult is not a reason for not doing it.


Common Yellowthroat

Union Bay Natural Area

Spring 2022

Follow on twitter/X: https://x.com/RickMatsen
Follow on facebook: https://www.facebook.com/shoulder.arthritis
Follow on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/rick-matsen-88b1a8133/

Here are some videos that are of shoulder interest
Shoulder arthritis - what you need to know (see this link).
How to x-ray the shoulder (see this link).
The ream and run procedure (see this link).
The total shoulder arthroplasty (see this link).
The cuff tear arthropathy arthroplasty (see this link).
The reverse total shoulder arthroplasty (see this link).
The smooth and move procedure for irreparable rotator cuff tears (see this link)
Shoulder rehabilitation exercises (see this link).


Friday, August 22, 2025

Shoulder Arthroplasty Failure Research in action

Most patients having primary arthroplasty do well, 

thus we learn most from studying the failures.


Publications of shoulder arthroplasty outcomes usually report the diagnostic categories associated with failure, such as glenoid component loosening, rotator cuff tear, infection, or instability. While such classifications are descriptively useful, they provide little insight into how failures might be prevented for future patients.

As Judea Pearl has emphasized in his must-read book

actionable knowledge is more likely to arise from asking the counterfactual question: “What might have been done differently that could have prevented this complication?” This principle underlies the Shoulder Arthroplasty Failure Research initiative, which seeks to move beyond descriptive epidemiology toward identification of surgeon-controlled, modifiable factors that govern arthroplasty failure.

A recent study exemplifies this approach: Humeral and glenoid component malposition in patients requiring revision shoulder arthroplasty: a retrospective, cross-sectional study.” In this investigation, failure of a primary arthroplasty was defined as the occurrence of revision. The authors reviewed 234 revision shoulder arthroplasties performed at 3 institutions.

They reported demographic characteristics and frequencies of revision types following hemiarthroplasty, anatomic total shoulder arthroplasty (TSA), and reverse total shoulder arthroplasty (RSA)



While such descriptive information is important, it does not inform strategies for prevention of arthroplasty failure for patients having arthroplasty in the future. 

The study focused on some of the factors under the surgeon’s control, specifically the position of glenoid and humeral components. The findings were striking: glenoid malposition was identified in 51% of anatomic TSA revisions and 93% of RSA revisions. Humeral component malposition was also frequent, present in 57% of anatomic TSA, 62% of RSA, and 54% of hemiarthroplasty cases. These observations support the counterfactual inference that had the components been positioned appropriately, the likelihood of failure requiring revision may well have been substantially reduced. 

Here are a few examples from the article.

Placement of the RSA baseplate in superior tilt.


Superior placement of the RSA baseplate.



Superior placement of the humeral component in anatomic TSA


Inadequate humeral neck cut in hemiarthoplasty resulting in
superior-medial placement of the humeral component and overstuffing of the joint.

In that the surgeon is the method, each of these malpositions could have been avoided by better surgical technique.  The institutions conducting the revisions were usually not involved in the majority of the primary procedures and thus medical records for many of these patients could not be fully reviewed. As a result, the characteristics of the surgeon performing the primary arthroplasty that was revised (age, training, years in practice, arthroplasty experience, etc) were not available, but would be of great interest.

Comment: This is an imporant study in that it identifies actions that shoulder surgeons can take to reduce the risk of arthroplasty failure for their future patients. It provides a model of how clinically meaningful shoulder arthroplasty failure research can be conducted.

This is an uncommon bird, but well worth investigating.


Elegant Trogan
Madera Canyon, Tucson AZ
May, 2022

Follow on twitter/X: https://x.com/RickMatsen
Follow on facebook: https://www.facebook.com/shoulder.arthritis
Follow on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/rick-matsen-88b1a8133/

Here are some videos that are of shoulder interest
Shoulder arthritis - what you need to know (see this link).
How to x-ray the shoulder (see this link).
The ream and run procedure (see this link).
The total shoulder arthroplasty (see this link).
The cuff tear arthropathy arthroplasty (see this link).
The reverse total shoulder arthroplasty (see this link).
The smooth and move procedure for irreparable rotator cuff tears (see this link)
Shoulder rehabilitation exercises (see this link).