Showing posts with label Kahneman. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kahneman. Show all posts

Saturday, May 10, 2025

Our orthopaedic judgment is flawed by noise

Recently, I posted on the surgical relevance of Daniel Kahnemann's well-known book, Thinking Fast and Slow and even more recently on his concept of "objective ignorance" in making predictions of treatment outcomes.

Now let's look at his last major book before his death one year ago by assisted suicide in Nunningen, Switzerland, choosing to end his life while still in relatively good health to avoid the potential suffering associated with aging.


He pointed out that where there is judgment, there is error. 

Two contributors to error can be illustrated by the kicker's judgment exercised when trying for a field goal. 
On the left we see Bias, a predictable, consistent deviation in a particular direction - perhaps due to wind direction, or way the holder positions the ball.
On the right we see Noise: imprecision, inconsistency, unpredictability, the lack of reproducibility. 


An important difference between these two sources of error is that bias can be identified and corrected (by directing the kick a bit windward or changing the holder's positioning of the ball). The inconsistency of noise makes it harder to fix (why does the ball go too far to the left sometimes and too far to the right on other occasions?).

BIAS

What about bias in orthopaedic practice? Here are some possible examples:

*financial bias: a surgeon may consistently recommend surgery more often than non-operative care because surgery pays better.

*practice bias: surgeons working in the Kaiser system, a Veterans' Administration hospital, a private practice, a Public Health Service hospital and an academic medical center may be subject to consistent but different influences on how they practice. This type of bias may be further influenced by ownership of a surgery center, MRI, or PT facility and by the incentive system of the practice (whether based on dollars collected or on Relative Value Units (RVU)). 

*selection bias: a surgeon may consistently favor different treatments depending on the patients' age, sex, ethnicity, or insurance (private, workers' compensation, medicaid, medicare, self-pay).

*training bias: surgeons having completed a sports medicine bias have been shown to be more likely to perform reverse total shoulders for cuff intact glenohumeral arthritis than surgeons having completed a shoulder fellowship.

*familiarity bias: surgeons may be more comfortable with an open bone block for instability associated with glenoid deficiency than with arthroscopic iliac crest grafting. 

*availability bias: the tendency to treat a patient based on their similarity to a recent case rather than on the surgeon's overall experience.

*hindsight bias: distortion of judgment so that outcomes that could not have been anticipated appear easily "foreseeable" in retrospect.

There are circumstances in which bias is appropriate and necessary. It seems best of these biases can be stated in terms of rules. Rules can shared with patients so they do not feel that decisions are being made randomly.  Here are some possible examples:

*Degenerative cuff tears are not considered for surgery until after 6 weeks of a defined therapy program

*Elective arthroplasty is not performed within 3 months of an intra-articular corticosteriod injection, or on patients who are actively smoking or on patients that do not have an adequate post discharge support system.


NOISE

A certain amount of noise may be acceptable. While this kicker's performance shows some noise, each kick landed in between the uprights. 

Kahnemann refers to this as the "valley of the normal", meaning that outcomes within the valley are OK but those outside the valley are undesirable. Some examples: insertion of an implant within 4 degrees of the desired position can lead to good function; however when the implant is in 20 degrees of varus or valgus, the outcomes can be disastrous. 

Importantly, the effects of noise do not cancel out. The average position of the six kicks is right in the middle of the uprights, but only 2 of the 6 kicks resulted in points for the kicker's team.

Varus and valgus errors do not cancel each other out either. 10 too tight shoulders and 10 too loose shoulders are not perfect on the average.

Kahnemann manages this phenomenon by using the mean of squared errors (MSE). The magnitude of each error is squared. This has two benefits: (1) the direction of the error doesn't matter (an error of +5 degrees gets the same weight as an error of -5 degrees) and (2) larger errors have a much greater effect on the mean than small errors.

Consider two surgeons. Note that they both have average errors in implant position of zero. However, because of the small magnitude of Surgeon A's errors, the mean of her squared errors is almost a tenth of the MSE for Surgeon B (who brags that his implants are, on average, in perfect position). Who would you have your relative see?


We can only conclude that noise is never good and that the ill effects of noise rise rapidly with the amount of individual deviation from the target.

Kahneman points out several types of noise

System noise – total amount of imprecision – the degree to which the treatment decisions vary – either within a surgeon (day 1 vs day 2) or among surgeons (A vs B)

Pattern noise – variations among the treatments different surgeons select for a given diagnosis. When a patient solicits a second opinion from a surgeon who is unaware of the first surgeon's opinion, the two opinions are unlikely to be the same. Anatomic vs reverse, PT vs surgery, ORIF vs arthroplasty, single row vs double row, biologics vs none, and so on.

Occasion noise – random differences in the treatments a surgeon selects for a diagnosis under varying circumstances (his mood, the time of day, fatigue, hunger, a recent fight with domestic partner, or the fiscal health of practice). Consider the following chart regarding judgments by two surgeons in the treatment of osteoarthritis with an intact cuff, cuff tear arthropathy with pseudoparalysis, cuff tear arthropathy without pseudoparalysis, massive irreparable cuff tear with pseudoparalysis and massive irreparable cuff tear without pseudoparalysis. 

1 Note that there is substantial system noise (patients with the same diagnosis are getting different treatments). 

2 Note that the patterns of the two surgeons are level but different. 

3 Note that on different occasions an individual surgeon selects different treatments for the diagnosis.

 


It is understandable that this noise causes confusion on what to do for whom.

Our American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons has tried to come up with practice guidelines or "Appropriate Use Criteria (AUC)", but the results are not always helpful because of noise.

Here are three examples regarding the treatment of rotator cuff tears.


(1) Use of biologics (e.g., PRP) to improve healing: Limited and conflicting evidence; no strong recommendation for or against.

(2) Early vs delayed surgery in chronic tears: Evidence is limited; clinical judgment is important.

(3) Tendon transfers (e.g., latissimus dorsi, lower trapezius) for massive irreparable tears in younger active patients: Evidence limited; decision individualized.

One final point, not only does noise complicate decisions made by patients and by surgeons, it also complicates clinical research: if each case is a "one of" receiving "individualized" management based on their particular surgeon's judgment, how can we learn what works best for which diagnoses in which patients?


Let me end this noisy post with a final salute to the mothers of the world. Here's a photo of a red tailed hawk mom tending her chicks that I took on a recent trip to the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in Oregon. 




You can support cutting edge shoulder research that is leading to better care for patients with shoulder problems, click on this link


Follow on twitter/X: https://x.com/RickMatsen
Follow on facebook: https://www.facebook.com/shoulder.arthritis
Follow on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/rick-matsen-88b1a8133/

Here are some videos that are of shoulder interest
Shoulder arthritis - what you need to know (see this link).
How to x-ray the shoulder (see this link).
The ream and run procedure (see this link).
The total shoulder arthroplasty (see this link).
The cuff tear arthropathy arthroplasty (see this link).
The reverse total shoulder arthroplasty (see this link).
The smooth and move procedure for irreparable rotator cuff tears (see this link)
Shoulder rehabilitation exercises (see this link).


Saturday, April 26, 2025

Objective ignorance - a problem in predicting outcomes in climbing and in orthopaedic surgery


Mount Rainier is a popular climbing destination. Approximately 10,000 registered climbers attempt to reach its 14,000 foot summit each year. From the graph below we can see that the base rate for fatalities among these climbers averages about 3 per ten thousand (0.3 per thousand). However, the per year rate varies substantially. We are unable to predict the death rate for the coming year because we cannot anticipate what factors will contribute to the death rate in 2026. Daniel Kaheman refers to this as "objective ignorance".


A striking example of our inability to predict the occurrence of climbing deaths was in 1981when an avalanche killed 11 Rainier climbers. 

This event stands as the deadliest mountaineering accident in U.S. history.​ On that day, a group of 29 climbers, including guides and clients from Rainier Mountaineering Inc., were ascending the Ingraham Glacier route. At approximately 5:45 a.m., a massive serac—an unstable block of glacial ice—broke loose from the upper Ingraham Glacier, triggering an avalanche of ice and snow. The avalanche swept through the climbers' resting area near Disappointment Cleaver, burying 11 individuals under tons of ice and snow. Despite extensive search efforts, the victims' bodies were never recovered and remain entombed within the glacier.

As an aside, my wife and I (and many others) safely summited Rainier by the Ingraham Glacier route both before and after that accident. 


Climbers refer to avalanches as objective hazards - dangers that exist independently of a person's actions, skill, or decisions - they are external, uncontrollable risks inherent to the environment. In this case the National Park Service Board determined "that the accident was a random event that could not have been predicted."

In orthopaedic surgery, objective ignorance keeps us from accurately predicting outcomes for our patients. As pointed out in a prior post, two year ASES scores for patients with cuff intact arthritis having reverse total shoulder arthroplasty have a base rate averaging 83 [SD 12.6]. Yet these numbers do not enable surgeons to accurately predict the result in an individual case because we are ignorant of the "random events" that could have profound effects on the outcome realized by the patient. An unexpected optimization of their social or rehabilitation support may lead an exceptionally good recovery. Conversely, the outcome is likely to be subpar after an acromial/spine stress fracture or the onset of Parkinson's Disease leading to multiple falls and dislocations. In addition, the new implants a surgeon has started to use may be found to have consistently better outcomes, or they may have a design flaw that only becomes evident months after the procedure.

The point here is that while we may know the average base rates for the outcomes of surgical procedures performed in the past, we need to be cautious about using this information to make predictions about future results for an individual patient because we are ignorant of the objective factors that may affect that person's outcome. 

You can support cutting edge shoulder research that is leading to better care for patients with shoulder problems, click on this link

Follow on twitter/X: https://x.com/RickMatsen
Follow on facebook: https://www.facebook.com/shoulder.arthritis
Follow on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/rick-matsen-88b1a8133/

Here are some videos that are of shoulder interest
Shoulder arthritis - what you need to know (see this link).
How to x-ray the shoulder (see this link).
The ream and run procedure (see this link).
The total shoulder arthroplasty (see this link).
The cuff tear arthropathy arthroplasty (see this link).
The reverse total shoulder arthroplasty (see this link).
The smooth and move procedure for irreparable rotator cuff tears (see this link)
Shoulder rehabilitation exercises (see this link).


Saturday, April 19, 2025

Surgical thinking: fast and slow - amended per Dr Collin

 
As a departure for the "usual and customary" blog post, I'm sticking my neck out to call reader's attention to a book suggested to me by Philippe Collin. You may or may not be aware of it.

 


Thinking, Fast and Slow, written by Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman, can help shoulder surgeons gain important insight into how they make decisions. It explores the interaction between fast, intuitive, instinctive, emotional thinking (“System 1”) and slow, deliberate, logical thinking (“System 2”). 

System 1 operates almost automatically, takes mental shortcuts (heuristics) and is prone to biases and errors. It overestimates the surgeon's knowledge and predictive ability, ignoring data/statistics in favor of recent experience, stereotypes and incomplete information (limiting consideration to "what you see is all there is - WYSIATI", failing to consider other relevant information). It is driven by an optimism bias, underestimating time, costs, and risks. When faced with a difficult question (e.g. “what are the odds of a good treatment outcome for this patient in my hands?”), System 1 substitutes an easier question (“what recent impressive outcomes come to my mind?” - known as the "availability heuristic"), overestimating positive results and underestimating complication rates. It is subject to "anchoring", e.g. a surgeon may focus on a patient's initial MRI and discount new data (e.g., improvement with physical therapy).

System 2 strives to avoid these errors, but requires substantial effort, deliberation, concentration, logic and data; it should be brought into play for complex impactful decisions and when the lazy System 1 is at risk for failure. It asks questions like “For the different treatment options, what are the published base rates for good and adverse outcomes; improvement in comfort and function; and time to recovery for similar patients with similar diagnoses?” and "H
ow do we reconcile the data indicating that (a) less than 5% of patients with rotator cuff tears have surgery with (b) rotator cuff surgery is the commonest of shoulder surgeries?" It also asks questions like “what accounts for the variability among surgeons (e.g.surgeon training, practice environment, economics, age)”? as well as “what factors may bias decisions among treatment options (e.g. a surgeon with a financial interest in an outpatient surgical center may be biased toward patients and treatments that can be accommodated there)? System 2 should be informed by a surgeon’s personal documented outcomes and complications for similar patients with similar diagnoses that she or he has treated. System 2 should consider contradictory evidence against a considered surgery before proceeding: what are the "cons". System 2 invites a colleague's opinion when the decision-making is difficult. System 2 requires concentration, which may be compromised by distracting conversation or music in the operating room.

Finally, the book points out that people, including surgeons and patients, are only human. The decisions individuals make are influenced by "priming" (what happened to them just before making the decision; are they happy, rested, hungry, just having a bad day?) and by "framing", i.e. how is information presented: if you have $50 would you rather keep $20 or lose $30? (most folks would choose to “keep $20” even though the two choices are equivalent!). Similarly, is a procedure with a 7% revision rate better or worse than a procedure with a 93% revision free record?

With apologies for the amateur nature of this "book report" (my first since I graduated from the University of Texas in 1964),  I hope I've stimulated your interest in Kahneman and his thoughtful consideration of how we make decisions. 

Fascinating to see how Daniel Kahneman’s work on the two systems of thinking resonates with daily practice in shoulder surgery.
Two examples come to mind:
🔹 For years, we linked acromion shape with rotator cuff tears. The idea was simple, logical, and compelling… yet clinical reality and recent data suggest the causal relationship is much less clear than we once believed.
🔹 Another example: the early success of the so-called “Grammont design” reverse shoulder prosthesis was largely attributed to medialization and distalization. However, it now seems likely that the real key was the robust glenoid fixation—with a central peg and four screws.
These examples are powerful reminders of the importance of stepping back and being cautious with theories that feel too coherent. A good story is not a substitute for solid evidence.
hashtagShoulderSurgery hashtagKahneman hashtagCognitiveBias hashtagOrthopedics hashtagClinicalThinking



Red-shafted flicker

You can support cutting edge shoulder research that is leading to better care for patients with shoulder problems, click on this link

Follow on twitter/X: https://x.com/RickMatsen
Follow on facebook: https://www.facebook.com/shoulder.arthritis
Follow on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/rick-matsen-88b1a8133/

Here are some videos that are of shoulder interest
Shoulder arthritis - what you need to know (see this link).
How to x-ray the shoulder (see this link).
The ream and run procedure (see this link).
The total shoulder arthroplasty (see this link).
The cuff tear arthropathy arthroplasty (see this link).
The reverse total shoulder arthroplasty (see this link).
The smooth and move procedure for irreparable rotator cuff tears (see this link)
Shoulder rehabilitation exercises (see this link).